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Among the most highly-praised Western scholars on historical and contemporary
religious and cultural issues in the Middle East has been British-American Professor Bernard
Lewis, whose relatively recent works include New York Times bestseller What Went Wrong? The
Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East and national bestseller The Crisis of
Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. In What Went Wrong? Lewis highlights the deterioration of
scientific discovery in the Muslim world as it occurred with the decline of the Ottoman Empire,
the rise of Western intellectualism and the Enlightenment as it occurred with the rise of the
European empires, and the subsequent failure of the Islamic world to modernize at the same rate
as the West technologically, intellectually, and economically, allowing the West to hold
dominance over the rest of the world in these aspects. In The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and
Unholy Terror, Lewis discusses the causes and historical roots of anti-Western sentiments
carried by today’s radical Islamic groups and how these sentiments pertain to several problems
prevalent in the Middle East and the Islamic world, such as poverty, economic imbalance, and
oppressive, often Western-backed, rulers. The two writings convey information in an eloquent
and scholarly manner, complete with citations of Ottoman sources, traditional Islamic narrations,
and Quranic verses, so much so that some critics have named Lewis “the world’s foremost
scholar of Islam”24.
Unfortunately, The Crisis of Islam and What Went Wrong? may not possess the amount
of scholarly accuracy and objectivity that Lewis’s eloquence and neat, formal citations would
imply. A critical reading of the two works by anyone with an objective background on the
history of the Middle East, its historical relationship with the West, and the various beliefs of the
Muslim world reveals several flaws and fallacies in Lewis’s books and puts to doubt the author’s
objectivity on several issues discussed in them. Examples of such facts and issues whose
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accuracy and objectivity in the books are put into question include the views of Ottoman officials
on learning from the West and whether this should be considered to be an unheard-of or
inconceivable idea at the time, Lewis’s statement that the “formative first generation of
Muslims” suffered no persecution by a hostile state power, the views and statements of
Ayatollah Khomeini on various issues, especially those pertaining to women’s rights, and
Lewis’s views on the roles that the United States played in the Middle East following World War
II. This critique aims to prove to readers that Orientalists do not always supply the most accurate
information concerning their area of study, the Middle East, and that any seeker of the truth
concerning the way Middle Easterners and their history are viewed today should look to reliable
Middle Eastern historical sources in order to acquire the most objective understanding
concerning these issues.
One of the objectionable claims made by Bernard Lewis in his book What Went Wrong?
occurs when he attempts to attribute the fact that Ottoman scholars explain the “extraordinary
deference given to women in Christendom” with the theory that women in Christendom are
“respected out of love for Mother Mary”. Lewis goes on to state that this theory “should not be
dismissed as absurd”, explaining that one should bear in mind that “according to Islamic
tradition, the Trinity, worship of which Islam condemns as near-polytheistic blasphemy,
consisted of God, Jesus, and Mary”, and following this statement with a citation of Chapter 5
Verse 119 of the Quran, where Jesus rejects the idea of the Trinity, shown in an answer to a
question from God: “Did you tell people: ‘Worship me and my mother as gods apart from
God?’”, to which Jesus replies with “unequivocal denial”25.
Firstly, the Quranic verse that Lewis attempted to cite was Verse 116 of Chapter 5 and
not Verse 1192, and whether this mistake was due to a typographical error is irrelevant,

Jawad 4

nevertheless, Verse 116 is often cited by Christians who attempt to refute the Quran as a book
written by Prophet Mohammad rather than the revelation of God 1. If we, for the sake of
argument, assume that this idea is indeed correct and that Prophet Mohammad simply wrote
about what he perceived as true as he spread his religion through the Arabian Peninsula; that
Christians believed in the Virgin Mary as the third member of the Trinity, does the fact remain
that this belief was a misconception? One only has to look at the historical beliefs of the
Christians of Arabia to know that this so-called misconception was not entirely unfounded. Apart
from the Ghassanids who rejected the Trinity doctrine of the Nicene Council 6, there existed other
sects and movements in Christianity that propagated beliefs different from those of orthodox
Christianity, such as the Collyridian sect, who preached the belief that the Virgin Mary was to be
worshipped as a goddess and that offerings were to be made to her. In fact, there existed a group
at the Nicene Council who held this belief in the divinity of the Virgin Mary, and who said that
Jesus and Mary were two gods besides God the Father, earning the name “Marianites” 14.
Therefore, at some point in time and at some location, there existed groups of Christians who
held the belief in the divinity of the Virgin Mary or that she was part of the Trinity, and thus to
say that Prophet Mohammad was wrong in his alleged assumption would be incorrect. One may
also make the observation that statues and images of Jesus Christ and his mother the Virgin Mary
can be found and are venerated in most Orthodox and Catholic churches as sacred statues. It can
also be observed that the congregations at these churches venerate Jesus Christ as God the Son
and his mother Mary as the Mother of God, and that these Catholic and Orthodox congregations
form the majority of Christians in the world. However, in these very churches, an image or statue
of the Holy Spirit for congregations to venerate has not been established 18.
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If one, however, assumes that the Quran is indeed divine revelation and not the writing or
invention of Prophet Mohammad, it follows that the very words that create the form of the verses
are eloquent statements from God and that they accept neither addition nor substitution, as the
verses already portray the teachings of God perfectly as they were meant to be portrayed. With
this idea, one can read Chapter 4 Verse 171 of the Quran: “O People of the Book! Commit no
excesses in your religion, nor say of God aught but the truth. Christ Jesus the son of Mary was
(no more than) an apostle of God, and His Word, which He bestowed on Mary, and a Spirit
proceeding from Him: so believe in God and His apostles. Say not ‘Trinity’ (in another
translation, “Say not ‘Three’”1): desist. It will be better for you: For Allah is One God: Glory be
to Him: (Far Exalted is He) above having a son. To Him belong all things in the heavens and on
earth. And enough is Allah as a Disposer of affairs” 2. The verse is addressed to the “People of
the Book”, in context an obvious reference to the Christians, and it describes Jesus Christ as the
son of the Virgin Mary and a creation and apostle of God, and not the son of God. It also
denounces the Christian belief in the Trinity explicitly with the word “Trinity” in some
translations and “Three” in others. If one returns to the original verse in dispute (Chapter 5 Verse
116), it can be observed that the verse mentions the worship of Jesus and his mother Mary
alongside God, but also that there is no explicit mention of a Trinity or a “Three”. It can also be
observed that in the second verse cited (Chapter 4 Verse 171), Mary is mentioned only as the
mother of the apostle Jesus, and the Trinity mentioned in the verse does not relate to her mention
in any way. This is because the verse in dispute is not referring to the worship of God as three,
but the worship of Jesus as the son of God and the worship of Mary as the mother of God, a
doctrine followed by the majority of ancient and modern Christians, although the worship of
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Mary as the mother of God was abandoned by the Protestants, who form a minority when
compared to the Catholic and Orthodox majority worldwide18.
Following these arguments, Lewis’s claim that “according to Islamic tradition, the
Trinity… consisted of God, Jesus, and Mary” can be said to be founded on either incomplete
interpretation or blatant misinterpretation that possibly caters to the Western Christian majority
who may use the claim in attempt to refute Islam and the Quran rather than learn more about
them, and therefore it is a claim of questionable objectivity that should not have been made in a
supposedly objective historical work.
More objectionable claims by Bernard Lewis in his work What Went Wrong? occur when
he speaks of the “most profound single difference” between Islamic and Western civilizations to
be the “status of women”, stating that “according to Islamic law and tradition, there were three
groups of people who did not benefit from the general Muslim principle of legal and religious
quality – unbelievers, slaves, and women”, with women being the “worst-placed of the three”,
since “the slave could be freed by his master; the unbeliever could at any time become a believer
by his own choice, and thus end his inferiority”, but “only the woman was doomed forever to
remain what she was”. He goes on to tell of the struggle for women’s rights in the Islamic world
and how these efforts were targeted by “different schools of the militant Islamic revival. The
Ayatollah Khomeini, in particular, gave it a prominent place in his indictment of the misdeeds of
the shah and the crimes of his regime. From a traditional point of view, the emancipation of
women – specifically, allowing them to reveal their faces, their arms, and their legs, and to
mingle socially in the school or the workplace with men – is an incitement to immorality and
promiscuity, and a deadly blow to the very heart of Islamic society” 25.
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The wording that Lewis uses in these excerpts seems all too similar to the Orientalist
stereotype of Muslim women where they are forced by their husbands and families to cover
themselves fully from head to toe, including the face, and are only allowed to do what male
members of their households tell them to do, playing a subordinate role to men of their society.
This is not to say that this stereotype is entirely unfounded; unfortunately, this image is all too
familiar in the minds of Westerners, as they have seen it not only in the works of Orientalists but
also in real life, mostly due to the efforts of a certain oil-rich kingdom on the Persian Gulf that
claims to rule by the laws of Islamic Sharia. Concerning the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it is a
state that gained power and continues to maintain control over its citizens through the use and
empowerment of the Wahhabi ideology originated in the 18 th Century by the theologian
Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahhab of Najd. Although the followers of the Wahhabi ideology form a
minority in the international Muslim community, the thoughts and practices of the Wahhabi
school of thought are publicized by Western media as traditional Islam much more than the
thoughts and practices of the major, more traditional schools of thought, making the Wahhabis a
very loud and prominent minority.
Unlike Saudi Islamic laws, which Egyptian scholar Mohammad Al-Ghazali is said to
have described as “based on a Bedouin jurisprudence and as such can only offer a puerile
understanding of creed and law”10 , traditional Islam granted women rights beyond those afforded
to Christian and Jewish women at the dawn of Islam. In pre-Islamic Arabia, women could
“neither own property nor inherit it from their husbands”, in fact they themselves were
considered property, and both a wife and “her dowry would be inherited by the male heir of her
deceased husband”, and if the male heir was not interested in the widow, he could hand her over
to a brother or relative “who could then marry her and take control of her dead husband’s
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property”, but if the widow is too old to remarry, ownership of herself and her dowry returns to
her clan6.
The advent of Islam brought with it efforts by Mohammad to provide women with some
degree of equality and social independence by changing the traditional laws of inheritance and
marriage and by removing “obstacles that prohibited women from inheriting and maintaining
their own wealth” 6. For the first time, women were given the right to keep their dowries as their
own personal property and also the right to inherit property belonging to their husbands.
Husbands were forbidden from using their wives’ dowries and were forced to use their own
wealth to provide for their families, as evidenced in Chapter 4 Verse 34 of the Quran: “Men shall
take full care of women with the bounties which God has bestowed more abundantly on the
former than one the latter, and with what they may spend out of their possessions. And the
righteous women are the truly devout ones, who guard the intimacy which God has [ordained to
be] guarded. And as for those women whose ill-will you have reason to fear, admonish them
[first]; then leave them alone in bed; then beat them (in another translation, “talk to them
suasively; then leave them alone in bed [without molesting them] and go to bed with them [when
they are willing]” 6); and if thereupon they pay you heed, do not seek to harm them. Behold, God
is indeed most high, great!”5
For the sake of clarification, the Arabic word “adribuhunna” which appears in the verse
can be translated to “beat them”, “turn away from them”, “go along with them”, and even “have
consensual intercourse with them”, depending on the translator’s interpretation 6 . If one chooses
to follow the more widely used translation, “beat them”, they should be aware that many
prominent Muslim scholars, including Muslim, Tirmidhi, Abu Da’ud, Nasa’i, Ibn Majah, Tabari,
and Razi, agree that this “beating”, if it is resorted to at all, should be only symbolic and only for
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the purpose of admonishment, to the extent that Tabari quotes early scholars to have said “with a
toothbrush, or some such thing” and Razi quotes them to have said “with a folded handkerchief”,
and if this beating leaves so much as a red mark on the woman’s body, she is entitled to report
her husband to a jurist who would have him penalized for abuse 5. The verse gives men authority
of the women of their respective families only in issues where men are proven to be more able to
conduct and for which men have had a higher affinity, such as judiciary affairs. According to the
traditional explanation of this verse, a man has no authority or control over “the independence of
a woman in her individual will and activities; she decides what she wants and acts as she wishes,
and [he] has no right to interfere in any way – except when she intends to do something
unlawful”, which is where the measures of admonishment mentioned earlier come into play. The
purpose of the beginning of the verse is to maintain that the husband, as head of the household,
must spend his wealth to support his wife and children34.
This also includes wealth acquired from inheritance; although individual male heirs
receive a larger portion of the inheritance than female heirs, as evidenced by the first portion of
Chapter 4 Verse 11 of the Quran: “Concerning [the inheritance of] your children, God enjoins
[this] upon you: the male shall have the equal of two females’ share; but if there are more than
two females, they shall have two-thirds of what [their parents] leave behind; and if there is only
one, she shall have one-half thereof…”5, this is only due to the fact that the male has the
responsibility to spend his wealth to support his family, possibly including the female heirs,
while the female heir is free to take her share of the inheritance and spend it on whatever she
wishes. What is also noteworthy concerning this verse is the wording of “the male shall have the
equal of two females’ share” rather than “the female shall have the equal of half of a male’s
share” in both the translation and in the original Arabic text, in that it elevates the status of
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women by treating their share the “yardstick”, so to speak, by which the share of the male heir is
measured, and this trend of describing the inheritance of a male in relation to a female share is
continued in the verses that follow34 .
As for the claim that traditional Islam in general and Ayatollah Khomeini in specific view
“the emancipation of women – specifically, allowing them to reveal their faces, their arms, and
their legs, and to mingle socially in the school or the workplace with men – is an incitement to
immorality and promiscuity, and a deadly blow to the very heart of Islamic society”, one only
has to examine the writings and declarations of Ayatollah Khomeini pertaining to the rights and
responsibilities of women to see that it is unfounded and untrue. When asked about what a return
to Quranic laws mean for women in the current Islamic Republic of Iran, Khomeini responded
by saying that in an Islamic system, “women, in their role as human beings, can work alongside
men to establish Islamic society, but not if they wish to act as mere objects. Women do not have
the right to lower themselves to such a level, nor do men have the right to think of them as
such”21. In an address made by Khomeini on March 6, 1979, to a group of women in Qum, Iran,
Khomeini first praises the efforts the women made in revolting against the Pahlavi regime,
stating that “in our revolutionary movement, women have likewise earned more credit than
men”, even while they “fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the men, or even in from of them”,
since it was “the women who not only displayed courage themselves, but also had reared men of
courage”, and then concludes by explaining important rights of women in an Islamic system,
specifically that, before a marriage contract is signed, the woman can “stipulate that if her
husband turns out to be of corrupt moral character or if he mistreats her, she would possess the
right to execute a divorce”, contrary to traditional Middle Eastern practice where only the
husband holds divorce execution rights, and that once the husband accepts such a stipulation, “he
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can never repudiate it”20. Concerning women’s right to vote in the Islamic Republic, Khomeini is
quoted to have said “I advise both men and women who are of legal voting age to take part in
these election and vote for any of the candidates they wish. Participate they must” 21, and
concerning the rights of women to interact with men in either social or professional
environments, Khomeini is quoted to have said in an interview with German reporters in Paris on
November 12, 1978, “in the Islamic Republic women have complete freedom in their education,
in everything that they do, just as men are free in everything” 26 .
It is obvious from the quotes above that Ayatollah Khomeini was not against the
freedoms given to women by the religion of Islam, as Lewis implied with his claim. However,
there still remains the issue of women exposing their faces, arms, and legs in Muslim society.
There are verses in the Quran describing modest dress for women and most noteworthy among
them are Chapter 33 Verse 59: “O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters, and the believing
women, that they should cast their outer garments over their persons [when abroad]: that is most
convenient, that they should be known [as such] and not molested. And God is Oft-Forgiving,
Most Merciful”2 , and Chapter 24 Verse 31: “and say to the believing women that they should
lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and
ornaments except what [must ordinarily] appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over
their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands’
fathers, their sons, (the list goes on)…; and that they should not strike their feet in order to draw
attention to their hidden ornaments. And O ye Believers! Turn ye all together towards God, that
ye may attain Bliss”2. As can be seen from the description given in the two verses, women are
required to cover their bodies with an “outer garment”, called a “jilbaab” in Arabic, and must
extend the veil that already covers their head so that it also covers the chest and neck area. There
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is no mention of the veiling or covering of the face, as is customary in Saudi Islamic law, and
many Islamic scholars, including Ayatollah Khomeini, agree that a woman’s face remains
uncovered when she wears the veil, or hijab. Many Islamic scholars also agree that the wearing
of the hijab cannot be forced upon a woman and that it is up to them woman to do it of her own
free will, as expressed by Khomeini in a 1978 interview with The Guardian newspaper in Paris,
“women are free in the Islamic Republic in the selection of their activities and their future and
their clothing”26.
As for Lewis defining the public revealing of women’s arms and legs as modernization
and “emancipation”, it must be stressed that the hijab was introduced to Islam as a protective
measure for women and as something that helps women in elevating their status and keeping
their dignity. The hijab was designed to protect women from being viewed by men and society in
general as sexual objects, as is common in this day and age, where the number of reports of
women raped in the highly modernized country of France in 2009 was 10,277 27. It may be
argued that a more effective measure of protection would be to allow women to reveal their
bodies as is practiced in the modern West and to simply educate the public about civilized
behavior and self-restraint, but this would be a somewhat weak argument, as a fairly recent
scientific study has shown that when the male brain is exposed to images of women who reveal
more of their bodies than would be considered modest, the areas of the brain associated with
handling tools become active, showing that the brain involuntarily depersonalizes the woman
into a sexual object as an evolutionary response to the need to procreate and spread genes 23 .
If this is Lewis’s idea of “emancipation” and modernization, where human beings are
reduced to animals bent on procreation, and where a democratically elected female
representative of parliament can be insulted from the floor of parliament, dismissed from her
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position, and even stripped of her citizenship simply because she wore a headscarf while taking
the oath of office, as did happen in 1998 to Merve Kavakci of the Turkish parliament 6, then it
shows how much Lewis cares for the rights and dignity and women. From an Islamic point of
view, this is not emancipation, but slavery itself. Therefore, the claims made by Bernard Lewis
concerning the legal quality of women in Islam and the opinions of traditional Islam and
Ayatollah Khomeini on women’s rights to social and professional lives can be ruled as ignorant,
unfounded, and lacking in objectivity, and are claims that should not have been made in a
supposedly objective book of history.
Another objectionable claim by Bernard Lewis in What Went Wrong? occurs when Lewis
discusses attempts by the Ottoman Empire to keep up with new technology and techniques made
available by their Christian rivals. He states that in the 18 th Century, Western visitors arrived in
the Ottoman Empire to teach Ottoman officials new techniques. According to Lewis, “for
Muslims, first in Turkey and later elsewhere, this [type of arrangement] brought a shocking new
idea – that one might learn from the previously despised infidel”. He later goes even further with
this claim when he describes the way the Ottomans began sending students to study in Western
countries, stating that “it is difficult for a Westerner to appreciate the magnitude of this change,
in a society accustomed to despise the infidel barbarians beyond the frontiers of civilization.
Even travelling abroad was suspect; the idea of studying under infidel teachers was
inconceivable” and calling it a “radical change” where “the scientific current had broken against
the dikes of literature and jurisprudence” 24.
A careful examination of the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad and major Islamic
scholars and also of the Islamic historical narrations and traditions reveals that the idea of
learning from the “despised infidel”, by which Lewis refers to a non-Muslim, was neither as
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shocking nor as inconceivable as Lewis makes it out to be. The seeking of knowledge is an area
that both the Quran and the Prophet Mohammad emphasized on many occasions. In fact, such
emphasis is placed in the very first word of the very first verse revealed of the Quran, Chapter 96
Verse 1, which commands the Prophet, “Read in the name of thy Sustainer, who has created” 22.
Many traditions quote the Prophet Mohammad where he encouraged and his Muslim community
to seek knowledge without specifying limitations on the people or locations that can be a source
of knowledge, and a few of them are: “seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave”; “the
acquisition of knowledge is a duty incumbent on every Muslim, male and female”; “that person
who shall pursue the path of knowledge, God will direct him to the path of Paradise”; “to listen
to the words of the learned, and to instill into others the lessons of science, is better than religious
exercises”32; and “a word of wisdom is an item the believer pursues; anywhere he finds it, he is
worthy of it”4 . More specific to the seeking of knowledge from sources outside a Muslim
environment, the Prophet is also narrated to have said “seek knowledge even as far as China”,
which, at the time and arguably to this day, was considered a non-Muslim source even more
distant from the society that the Prophet lived in than the Persian Empire, who were also
considered pagans at the time. “Knowledge” in this narration is also more likely to be a reference
to scientific rather than religious knowledge, as China was known to have deep knowledge in the
fields of medicine and literature, as well as the making of paper and the use of gunpowder 9.
In addition to the Prophet Mohammad, there are important figures in Islamic history who
also emphasized the acquisition of knowledge an wisdom without limiting the source of
knowledge, such as Mohammad’s cousin and son-in-law Ali bin Abu Talib, who is narrated to
have said “acquire wisdom and truth from whomever you can because even an apostate can have
them but unless they are passed over to a faithful Muslim and become part of wisdom and truth
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that he possesses, they have a confused existence in the minds of apostates”, and “knowledge
and wisdom are really the privilege of a faithful Muslim. If you have lost them, get them back
even though you may have to get them from the apostates” 16. The Imam Musa ibn Jafar, a highly
influential scholar who died around 799 C.E. and was a descendant of both Prophet Mohammad
and Ali bin Abu Talib, also remarked on the importance of the acquisition of knowledge no
matter where the source, and is narrated to have said “speaking to a scholar even at a dump-site
is better than speaking to an ignorant person at a best furnished palace” 3.
One can also examine the events after the Battle of Badr to discover that learning from
the non-Muslim was not a new idea at all by the 18 th Century. 313 Muslims from Medina led by
Prophet Mohammad fought against around 1000 pagans from Mecca led by the tribe of Quraysh.
The Muslims suffered 14 casualties while 70 Meccans were killed and around 70 were captured.
The Prophet is said to have consulted two of his companions concerning the fate of the prisoners;
one of them recommended executing them, and the other recommended freeing them after the
payment of a ransom. The Prophet decided to ransom the prisoners whose families were wealthy
enough to pay the ransom, and released those belonging to poorer families under the condition
that they each teach ten Muslims how to read and write. Those who were both poor and illiterate
were set free without ransom30.
Therefore, upon study of these traditions and historical narrations, it can be concluded
that the claim that learning from the “infidel” in the 18 th Century was a radically new and
inconceivable idea for Muslims in the Ottoman Empire is utterly false, as Islam had already
established the attainment of knowledge regardless of whether the source was inside or outside
of Muslim society during the time of Prophet Mohammad himself and this practice continued
even after the Prophet’s death.
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Yet another objectionable claim by Bernard Lewis occurs in The Crisis of Islam, where
Lewis attempts to compare the beginnings of Christianity and Islam, claiming that early
Christians were, in a manner of speaking, a persecuted opposition party to the pagan Romans.
“In pagan Rome”, Lewis states, “Caesar was God. For Christians, there is a choice between God
and Caesar, and endless generations of Christians have been ensnared in that choice”.
Meanwhile, when he speaks of Islam’s beginning, he states that “in Islam, there was no such
painful choice. In the universal Islamic polity as conceived by Muslims, there is no Caesar but
only God, who is the sole sovereign and the sole source of law. Muhammad was His Prophet,
who during his lifetime both taught and ruled on God’s behalf”. Lewis culminates the idea with
the statement that, as opposed to what occurred at the beginning of Christianity, “for the
formative first generation of Muslims, whose adventures are the sacred history of Islam, there
was no protracted testing by persecution, no tradition of resistance to a hostile state power. On
the contrary, the state that ruled them was that of Islam, and God’s approval of their cause was
made clear to them in the form of victory and empire in this world” 24.
If, by “formative first generation of Muslims”, Lewis meant the Prophet Mohammad and
his companions who began spreading Islam in Mecca then moved to Medina, then this claim not
only puts to doubt the credibility of Bernard Lewis as an expert on Islam but also the credibility
of critics who would praise him and call him “the world’s foremost scholar of Islam”. It does not
take a scholar to read any work on the history of Islam and learn that the very first generation of
Muslims did in fact suffer persecution because of their beliefs at the hands of the dominant force
in the region at the time, the powerful Meccans of Quraysh. When Prophet Moha mmad began to
preach his religion, the leaders of Quraysh recognized it not only as a challenge to the religious
beliefs held by the Meccans at the time, but also as a challenge to the social customs of Mecca,
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and warned the Prophet’s uncle Abu Talib that they will fight Mohammad until he ceases his
message, and offered that if Mohammad sought leadership or wealth through this new religion
they would grant them to him once he has desisted, to which the Prophet made his famous reply
“I swear by God, if they put the sun in my right hand and the moon in my left on condition that I
abandon this course before He has made it victorious, or I have perished therein, I would not
abandon it”28. At this point, the Prophet and his followers became subject to persecution from the
people of Mecca. The Quraysh prevented the Prophet and his followers from praying at the
Kaaba; the Prophet and his companions were pursued and covered with dirt and filth, and the
places they frequented for prayer and meditation had thorns scattered in them by the Meccans17.
Notable among the Quraysh leaders for his persecution of the Prophet was Abu Hakam (“Father
of Wisdom”), whose venomous attitude toward the Prophet and his followers resulted in his
name being changed to Abu Jahl (“Father of Ignorance”) in traditional Islamic narrations28. In
fact, Abu Jahl was known to be involved in the torture and death of Islam’s first martyr,
Sumayya bint Khubbat, the mother of the renowned companion of Prophet Mohammad, Ammar
bin Yasir, and to whom the Prophet himself had given tidings of Heaven33 .
Another of the famous stories of persecution of first-generation Muslims by the people of
Quraysh was the story of Bilal, the Abyssinian slave of the tribal leader Umayya. It is reported
that Umayya would “have Bilal dragged to the hot Arabian desert, where he would place large
stone blocks on Bilal’s chest and threaten to leave him there until Bilal renounced God and
accepted the [pagan] goddesses Lat and Uzza. Bilal simply repeated: ‘Ahad, Ahad’ (‘One,
One’)”28. When the persecution intensified, the Prophet Mohammad began sending small waves
of his followers to Abyssinia, to be under the just and tolerant rule of the Christian king AlNajashi, known to the West as Negus17. When Abu Talib continued to protect the Prophet, the
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leaders of Quraysh decided to extend their punishment over the entirety of Abu Talib’s clan, the
Beni Hashim. A decree to boycott the Beni Hashim was hung on the Kaaba stating that the tribe
of Quraysh will “renounce all intercourse with the children of Hashim – neither to buy nor sell,
neither to marry nor to give in marriage, but to pursue them with implacable enmity, till they
should deliver the person of Mohammad to the justice of the gods” 14. As a result of this boycott,
Prophet Mohammad’s beloved wife, Khadija, who had spent all of her wealth in support of the
new religion, and his uncle Abu Talib, who had sponsored and protected the Prophet since
childhood, died within the same year, a year that the Prophet named “the Year of Sadness” 28.
The Prophet resolved to move to the town of Taif in an attempt to gain some followers there, but
he was received coldly by the tribe of Thaqif, the inhabitants of Taif who refused to hear his
teachings and even drove him out of the town, and thus the Prophet returned to Mecca a month
later17 .
After the passage of some time, the Prophet Mohammad was approached by travelers
from the city of Yathrib (modern-day Medina) who offered their allegiance to him and asked him
to settle the hereditary tribal disputes between the tribes of Aws and Khazraj. The Prophet began
to send waves of his followers to Yathrib and stayed behind until he was prepared to flee Mecca
as well17. But even while he prepared to leave and conduct his famous Hijra, the leaders of
Quraysh, led by Abu Sufyan, plotted the assassination of Mohammad by sending a member from
each of the major tribes of Mecca so that each assassin may strike the Prophet in his bed,
spreading the guilt of Mohammad’s blood throughout the tribes and baffling any attempt at
revenge by the Beni Hashim. The Prophet was somehow made aware of this plot, however, and
escaped secretly at night while his cousin Ali bin Abu Talib lied in Mohammad’s bed as a decoy,
to the surprise of the Meccan assassins 14. As a result of the failed assassination attempt, the
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leaders of Quraysh placed a bounty of one hundred camels on the Prophet’s head 17. Even after
successfully reaching the city of Yathrib, the Prophet had to fight three major battles against the
Meccans of Quraysh: the Battle of Badr, where 313 Muslims defeated 1000 pagans; the Battle of
Uhud, where the Prophet lost his beloved youngest uncle Hamza bin Abdul Muttalib; and the
Battle of Khandaq, where the city of Yahtrib itself was besieged by ten thousand pagans 28 .
After signing the Treaty of Hudaibiya, which guaranteed that hostilities between Mecca
and Yathrib would cease for ten years, the Prophet Mohammad began to gather great numbers of
followers from the surrounding Arab and non-Arab tribes, but when the Quraysh violated the
agreement by attacking a clan that was allied with the Muslims, the Prophet marched on the city
of Mecca with ten thousand Muslims, conquering it with minimal resistance. It must be noted
that this was the first time in seven years the Prophet set foot in his beloved hometown, since he
was forced to flee to Yathrib during the Hijra as a result of his persecution by the Quraysh 17 .
After this brief study of early Islamic history, it can be seen as fairly obvious that the first
generation Muslims did in fact face persecution by the people in power at the time, and that the
religion did not simply succeed without any hardship or resistance. It can therefore also be
concluded that Bernard Lewis’s claim that the first generation of Muslims suffered no
persecution or resistance by a hostile state power is utterly false and blatantly ill-informed, and
can also be viewed as an attempt by Lewis to emotionally distance his Western Christian
audience from the early Muslims by making this false claim in a comparison with how much
early Christians suffered persecution under Roman rule. Both Christianity and Islam were
religions that challenged the customs and practices of the societies they reached and the powers
that governed them, and thus both religions faced a great deal of resistance and oppression before
they succeeded and became widespread.
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In The Crisis of Islam, Bernard Lewis also makes some objectionable claims concerning
the reasons and extent of interference of the United States in the Middle East during and after the
Cold War. While commenting on the collapse of the Soviet Union, which “left the United States
as the sole world superpower”, Lewis states that “it seemed that the era of imperial rivalry had
ended with the withdrawal of both rivals – the Soviet Union because it couldn’t, the United
States because it wouldn’t play the imperial role”, and that events such as the wars of Saddam
Hussein and the Iranian Revolution “forced the United States to involve itself more directly in
the affairs of the region”, which Middle Easterners saw as a “a new phase in an old imperial
game”, while Americans “did not, and showed that they had neither the desire nor the aptitude
for an imperial role”24 .
The word “imperialism” is defined by the Dictionary of Human Geography as “the
creation and/or maintenance of an unequal economic, cultural, and territorial relationship,
usually between states and often in the form of an empire, based on domination and
subordination”15 . With this knowledge, one can examine the policies practiced by the United
States in the Middle East during the Cold War. In July 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower
received a report from the National Security Council titled “United States Objectives and
Policies with Respect to the Near East”. Under the section “Objectives” is a list that includes the
following: “availability to the United States and its allies of the resources, the strategic position,
and the passage rights of the area and the denial of such resources and strategic positions to the
Soviet bloc”, “stable, viable, friendly governments in the area, capable of withstanding
communist-inspired subversion from within and willing to resist communist aggression”, and
“prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area”, among other goals pertaining to
reversing anti-American sentiments in the region and bringing peace between the Arabs and
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Israel13 . After reviewing the definition of imperialism and then reexamining the first two items
listed in the report, a critical reader may judge for himself whether the guarantee of the
availability of the resources of another state that is supposedly sovereign for the advantage of the
United States and the disadvantage of the Soviet Union through the placement and maintenance
of a government that may or may not be efficient or just in ruling its population, as long as it is
friendly and expedient to the United States and resistant to communism, can be seen as imperial
rule based on dominance or subordination.
If these theoretical policies are not enough to reveal the imperialist tendencies of the
United States during the Cold War, the coup d’etat that occurred in 1953 Iran can provide a more
practical example. In 1951, nationalist Iranian politician Mohammad Mosaddeq gained the
leadership of the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, as the country’s new prime minister. Because the
British had maintained absolute control over Iranian oil production since the concessions given
to William D’Arcy in 1901, any attempt by the Iranian parliament to increase Iran’s share of the
profits were hindered. The Iranian assembly under the command of Mosaddeq therefore voted to
nationalize Iran’s oil resources and remove them from the control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company19. This move by Mosaddeq was part of his nonalignment policy of “negative
equilibrium”, where the Iranian government would not take sides in the Cold War by a method
very different from that of the Qajar dynasty, whose nonalignment policy consisted of granting
equal concessions to both Britain and Russia so that both are appeased 13. In response to this bold
move, Britain began persuading the world’s oil companies to boycott Iranian oil, which, in the
case of the United states, was successful since major American oil companies had recently
suffered losses due to the nationalization of Mexican oil, making the idea of oil-producing
countries “nationalizing ‘their’ assets” a particularly disadvantageous one19. Anti-Mosaddeq
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sentiments began developing among the Iranian public because of this blow to the Iranian
economy, and these sentiments intensified among the conservative elements of society with the
help of British intelligence and one hundred thousand dollars from the CIA, who “claimed that
Mosaddeq’s movement was being manipulated by communists”. In 1953, the army seized
control of the country, ousting Mosaddeq and restoring the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah, an
authoritarian despot who sentenced Mosaddeq to house arrest until his death and who would
torment his people for more than 25 years, but who was allowed to maintain his power simply
because he was friendly to the United States and Britain13.
Later in The Crisis of Islam, Lewis establishes that the “former colonial subjects in the
Middle East” see America as “tainted by the same kind of imperialism as Western Europe”, but
while the Soviet Union, “which retained and extended the imperial conquests of the czars of
Russia, ruled with no light hand over tens of millions of Muslim subjects in Central Asia and in
the Caucasus”, it “suffered no similar backlash of anger and hatred from the Arab community” as
the United States did24. Firstly, this interchanging of the terms “Muslim” and “Arab” can be very
misleading to an uninformed audience, especially since it follows a reference to how America
was named “the Great Satan” after the Iranian Revolution. The Arab world and the Muslim
world are two distinct entities and must especially be treated as such if one is to discuss the
Middle East during the Cold War and how secular Arab nationalist regimes formed. Secondly,
this statement by Lewis is not entirely accurate, as countries that were both Arab and Muslim
had conflicting views on who to side with during the Cold War. A good example of such a
schism occurred during the civil war that was fought in Yemen from 1962 to 1967 between the
country’s socialist Republicans and its royalists. Legitimizing their point of view with the fight
against atheistic communism, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, Jordan, and the Gulf countries used
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Islamic rhetoric to back Yemeni royalists, even going so far as enlisting the help of the Muslim
Brotherhood in the secular, Republican-backing, Arab nationalist countries of Egypt, Syria, and
Iraq19. The civil war in Yemen served as a proxy war between the secular Arab nationalist
republics in the region and the monarchies that claimed to rule by the laws of Islam, and this
proxy war in turn served as a proxy war between the United States, which backed the
monarchies, and the Soviet Union, which backed the Arab nationalists. Therefore it can neither
be said that all of the Arab countries favored the Soviet Union, nor can it be said that all of the
Muslim countries despised the United States.
A major factor in the current views that Middle Easterners hold concerning the United
States has been its relationship with the state of Israel, which Lewis claims in The Crisis of Islam
to be “a consequence, not a cause, of Soviet penetration” in the surrounding region24 . This claim
is debatable in that the Soviet Union was known to be a nearly supporter of the state of Israel, as
the local Jewish community, the Yishuv, had a socialist ideology that had led Russian leadership
to believe that Israel would be more committed to Soviet goals. The Soviet Union had supported
the UN resolution that promised the Jews 55% of the Palestinian land, and also supplied Israel
with arms that helped it win its war of independence. In fact, the Soviet Union was the first
country to give Israel “full de jure recognition”, and even though the United States had
recognized Israel first, this recognition had been de facto and full recognition had not been
extended by the United States until early 1949. The souring of relations between Israel and the
Soviet Union was brought about by Israeli reliance upon American economic aid and its
denunciation of North Korea during the Korean War, combined with Russian anti-Semitism and
several policies that were starkly anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli, such as the detainment of Jewish
“economic criminals” in 1952 and Jewish doctors accused of conspiring against the Soviet
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government in 1953, resulting in Israel seeking a bilateral defense treaty with the United States.
This in turn resulted in the Soviet Union supporting the enemies of Israel, the Arab nationalist
states in the region, the most important of whom being Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser,
in an effort to challenge Western influence in the area, outflank NATO, and undermine the
Baghdad Pact8 . It can therefore be said that Soviet penetration in the Arab states of the region
surrounding Israel was due to the United States’ relationship and involvement with the state of
Israel.
An exploration of the extent of Western interference in Middle Eastern affairs brings us
to another of the objectionable claims made by Bernard Lewis in The Crisis of Islam where he
describes a demonstration that took place in Islamabad, Pakistan, during the seizure of the Grand
Mosque in Mecca. The demonstration had been in support of the rebels who seized the Mosque
and fought the Saudi security forces, and, due to a rumor that had been circulating and that was
“endorsed by Ayatollah Khomeini, who was then in the process of establishing himself as the
revolutionary leader in Iran – that American troops had been involved in the clashes in Mecca”,
“the American Embassy was attacked by a crowd of Muslim demonstrators, and two Americans
and two Pakistani employees were killed”. Before continuing to describe how relations between
Iran and the United States deteriorated after the Iranian Revolution, Lewis asks rhetorically,
“why had Khomeini stood by a report that was not only false but wildly improbable?” 24
Before evaluating Lewis’s claim that the report was false and improbable, one must first
recount the events that surrounded the demonstrations that occurred in Islamabad, namely, the
siege of Mecca. On the morning of November 20, 1979, after pre-dawn prayers had just been
concluded in the Grand Mosque of Mecca, a group of rebels led by the Bedouin preacher
Juhayman bin Sayf Al-Uteybi seized the Grand Mosque, armed with weapons smuggled in over
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a period of time in coffins. The gates of the Mosque were chained shut and snipers were posted
on the minarets, ordered to shoot government soldiers without pity or hesitation. Juhayman and
his followers then proceeded to spread among the pilgrims and worshippers at the Mosque their
message of how the Saudi government was unworthy of leadership of Muslims and how it has
been supportive of Western interference and influence that would corrupt and promote heresy in
Saudi society. The rebels then presented Juhayman’s brother-in-law, Mohammad Abdullah AlQahtani, and began pledging allegiance to him as the awaited Mahdi, the prophesized savior of
Islam who would restore justice to the world after it had been filled with corruption and injustice.
The Grand Mosque was surrounded by Saudi security forces led by Princes Nayef and Sultan bin
Abdul Aziz, and a strategic perimeter was formed 35. According to Lewis’s brief report on the
matter, “after some hard fighting, the rebels were suppressed. Their leader was executed on
January 9, 1980, along with sixty-two of his followers, among them Egyptians, Kuwaitis,
Yemenis, and citizens of other Arab countries” 24.
This was a very sensitive event in Saudi history, as the royal family of Al Saud
legitimizes its right to rule as the pious followers of the Sheikh Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahhab,
the founder of the Wahhabi school of thought. If someone were to rise up while accusing Al
Saud of impiety, with a ruler as legitimate as the awaited Mahdi, and while seizing the most holy
site in Islam, no less, their legitimacy and religious authority would surely be questioned. Since
the grand Mosque of Mecca was the holiest site of Islam, killing was strictly forbidden in on the
premises. Desperate measures had to be taken, however. With backing from the Grand Mufti of
Saudi Arabia and thirty clerics, the Saudi Ministry of Interior publicly declared the rebels
Kharijites, meaning “renegades” or “deviators from Islam”. Lethal action was therefore taken
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and lasted until the alleged Mahdi was slain and the rebels, along with their leader, were captured
and publicly executed35.
The demonstrations that occurred in Islamabad took place after rumors had spread that
those who had desecrated the Grand Mosque were in fact Americans and Zionists. Obviously, it
was not American troops who took over the Mosque on November 20, 1979, therefore this rumor
can be concluded to be false, and since non-Muslims have historically to this day been forbidden
entry to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, it is safe to say that the rumor is also “wildly
improbable”. Recent reports, however, show that while it was not the troops of America who
were involved in the clashes that occurred during those weeks, foreign intervention was sought
and granted not only by the United States but also by France. According to award-winning
journalist Yaroslav Trofimov’s The Siege of Mecca, which based its reports on recently
declassified CIA documents, “a quick conversion” to Islam of the horde of CIA operatives who
arrived in Mecca remedied the problem of non-Muslims entering the holy city, and “the agency’s
spooks made a rapid tour of the battlefield” to evaluate the giving of tear gas and smoke
equipment to Saudi security forces. This resort to chemical warfare, however, “proved to be a
complete fiasco”, as the gas inserted into the Mosque’s basement system, known as the Qaboo,
rose to the surface, meeting ill-prepared Saudi soldiers in the Mosque’s courtyard and
incapacitating them35. According to another report from Jeddah, the CIA had recommended that
Saudi soldiers flood the Qaboo, resulting in any rebels that survive drowning being forced to the
surface for immediate capture31.
The Saudi government later enlisted the help of the French GIGN, who sent a team of
commandos led by Paul Barril to evaluate the situation and to train Saudi soldiers in tactics.
After supplies for assault arrived from France, including 150 flak jackets and 300 kilograms of
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CB gas, Barril, “by his own account, briefly sneaked into the holy city and into the Grand
Mosque itself before the attack on the compound began”. As advised by the GIGN, crews of
workers began to drill holes in the floors of the Mosque in order for CB canisters to be fired
through them at rebels waiting in the Qaboo below. Saudi soldiers soon detonated their CB
canisters, “stunning the rebels trapped underneath in a cloud of powerful toxins”. Around 100
soldiers descended into the Qaboo armed with motor-powered CB-spraying devices that pumped
“rising clouds of gas into the narrow passageways”, followed by units armed with machine guns.
The fighting in the Qaboo continued until Juhayman himself was captured and brought to the
surface35 .
Though the report that resulted in the bloodshed that occurred at the American Embassy
in Islamabad was false, the claim that Americans and other Western powers were involved in
the conflict that took place in Mecca is not entirely unfounded, as members of the CIA were
converted to Islam specifically to enter the holy city and supply Saudi troops with weapons and
training, and a member of the GIGN admitted to entering the city secretly, a report agreed upon
by some American officials. Since Trofimov’s report was published years after The Crisis of
Islam, it is based on newly uncovered information, and newer editions of Lewis’s book, if they
should be published in the future, should be updated with this information in order to give
Lewis’s audience a better view of the extent of the involvement of the West in Middle Eastern
affairs that reaches even a location such as Mecca, considered by the majority of Middle
Easterners to be the least susceptible to penetration by foreign powers.
These have been just a few of the objectionable claims that Bernard Lewis makes in What
Went Wrong? and The Crisis of Islam, and there are many others, such as the simplistic and
baseless claim that “a significant number of Muslims – notably but not exclusively those whom
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we call fundamentalists – are hostile and dangerous not because we (the United States) need an
enemy but because they do” 24, but these claims are left up to the truth-seeking reader to research
and critique for himself. Instead the Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis himself will be critiqued
through what other scholars and analysts have reported about him.
Fouad Ajami, a senior fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institute and a self-proclaimed
disciple of Bernard Lewis claims that Lewis is “the great Orientalist of our time, and we shan’t
see the likes of him again” and that Lewis had foreseen the advent and effects of Islamic
fundamentalism before it occurred. Ajami, however, is part of a “tight circle of admirers”,
composed of “influential policymakers, many of whom served in the administration of President
George W. Bush”, including “former Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, Defense Policy Board Chair Richard Perle, Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith,
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and National Security Council for Near East and
North African Director Elliott Abrams” 7.
Much of this admiration can be attributed to the situation in the United States following
the events of September 11 th, 2001, when “American foreign policy under George W. Bush was
conducted by a group of men with whom Lewis was well-acquainted”, giving him “rare access to
the White House” and a chance to develop what he reported to be a “quite friendly relationship
with Cheney”. In fact, President Bush himself reportedly read a copy of What Went Wrong?
given to him by Condoleezza Rice, “who also met privately with Lewis, according to reports”.
Former Senior Advisor and Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove is said to have invited Lewis to
“address White House staffers, military aides and staff members of the National Security Council
in a closed meeting, where Lewis reportedly discussed the failures of contemporary Arab and
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Muslim societies and shared his opinions about the origins of the Muslim world’s antiAmericanism”7.
The types of admirers Lewis has should help the reader decide whether Lewis is a scholar
seeking a truthful and objective understanding of another culture’s history or a mercenary hired
by people of power to legitimize their points of view when they are challenged by the other
culture. Michael Hirsh, author of the 2004 article “Bernard Lewis Revisited”, claims that Lewis’s
credentials as an expert in Oriental studies gave the policies of the Bush administration
“intellectual credence”, adding that “it was a mistake to say [that 9/11] was an expression of
anger that represented the mainstream of the Arab and Muslim world… really, the U.S. had to
just wipe out Al Qaeda, but instead, they took on the entire Arab world. That’s where people like
Lewis led us astray and I don’t think anyone would cite him today without some sense of
irony… by his own volition, he left the academic world to become a political figure and that was
the beginning of the end of his reputation” 7.
Bernard Lewis is also known to have drawn much controversy with his remarks on the
severity of the Armenian genocide. In the first edition of his book The Emergence of Modern
Turkey, published in 1961, and in the second edition published seven years later, Lewis “had
termed the Armenian genocide a ‘holocaust’”. In the third edition published in 2002, however,
“he had a change of heart, replacing ‘holocaust’ with the word ‘slaughter’ and adding a reference
to Turkish deaths as well”. Prior to this, in 1985, he went so far as to urge “the U.S. Congress to
refrain from passing a resolution that would condemn the event as ‘genocide’, and after he
published a 1993 article on the subject in Le Monde, he was fined a symbolic one franc by
French courts under the country’s Holocaust-denial laws”. Remarking on the matter, Lewis states
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that “there is no doubt the Armenians suffered a terrible massacre, but to compare it to what
happened to the Jews in Nazi Germany is an absurdity”7.
The Jewish death toll in Nazi-occupied Europe during the Final Solution is estimated to
be around 5,933,900, amounting to 67% of the total Jewish population in the Nazi-occupied
territories of Europe11 . During the deportations organized by Turkish Minister of the Interior
Talaat Pasha, which came to be known as the Armenian Massacres of 1915, “hundreds of
thousands of Armenians eventually succumbed or were killed; Armenian sources have put the
figure as high as 1,500,000”, and although the exact figures are still under dispute, “there can be
no disputing the result: Turkish Armenia was destroyed, and about half of its people perished” 12 .
While it cannot be denied that the Holocaust that occurred in Nazi Germany had a much higher
death toll, making it one of the most appalling tragedies of the 20 th Century, as it should be
remembered, why should it be considered an “absurdity” to allow another people who had been
victimized severely unjustly to remember their victimization as another appalling tragedy? Since
when was it considered moral to exploit the remembrance of one tragedy at the expense of
another? Some sources have attributed Lewis’s “change of heart” concerning the Armenian
genocide to his close ties to the State of Israel; it is claimed that this relationship caused Lewis to
change his opinions about Turkey when it became the first Muslim state to recognize Israel and
also its longtime ally7. If this attribution is true, it shows the extent of Lewis’s credibility as a
competent and objective historian.
Speaking of Bernard Lewis, Middle East expert at the University of Denver Nader
Hashemi has remarked that “Lewis’s reputation within the community of Middle East scholars
has really sunk to an all-time low”, to the extent that students of Middle Eastern studies believe
that attending guest-lectures of Lewis may harm their career. While Hashemi includes one of
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Lewis’s works in his teaching syllabus, it is included “mostly as an example of the kind of
Orientalist scholarship students should learn to avoid”. Hashemi also claims that “Lewis is a
medievalist and he tries to interpret contemporary Islamic politics by going back to an earlier
time period where an ‘essential’ Islam allegedly existed. He uses this framework to explain
events that happen half a millennium later. He plays into a neoconservative right-wing agenda
that wants to control, manipulate and dominate the Middle East. His apocalyptic narrative fits
well with a Fox News audience, but it’s not serious political analysis or scholarship”, adding that
“he assumes there is a fossilized Muslim core that determines the way Muslims will always
behave and ignores changing social conditions in the Middle East” 7.
But perhaps the most famous of Bernard Lewis’s critics was the late Columbia University
professor Edward Said, who accused Lewis of “demagogy and downright ignorance” 7 and
claimed that his writing was “full of condescension and bad faith” 29 . He also claimed that
Lewis’s writing can be used as a “perfect exemplification of the academic whose work purports
to be liberal objective scholarship but is in reality very close to being propaganda against his
subject material”. Said has also made the claim that “according to Lewis, Islam, does not
develop, and neither do Muslims; they merely are, and they are to be watched”, a claim that is
similar to one made by Nader Hashemi. Concerning Lewis’s objectivity when speaking of
matters pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Said stated that “he will, for example, recite the
Arab case against Zionism… without at the same time mentioning – anywhere, in any of his
writings – that there was such a thing as a Zionist invasion and colonization of Palestine despite
and in conflict with the native Arab inhabitants. No Israeli would deny this, but Lewis the
Orientalist historian simply leaves it out”, along with any mention of the Emergency Defense
Regulations used in Israel “to rule the Arabs”, the preventive detention of Arabs by Israel, the
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illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, and the absence
of human rights for Arabs, “principal among them the right of immigration, in former Palestine”.
Said’s views on Lewis may be summarized with his statement that “Lewis’s verbosity scarcely
conceals both the ideological underpinnings of his position and his extraordinary capacity for
getting nearly everything wrong” 29.
Following these reports and following a critical look at some of the claims made by
Bernard Lewis in his relatively recent works What Went Wrong? and The Crisis of Islam, it can
be concluded that even with Lewis’s eloquent and scholar-like writing ability and his neat
citations, there are severe flaws in his writing and his ability to convey historical facts in an
objective manner. The aim of historical study is to be able to observe the actions and reactions
that made the world as it is today, and from these observations gain a better understanding of
other peoples, cultures, and belief systems in order to allow them to coexist in peace and
harmony. Lewis’s writing does not offer this understanding, rather, it drives his Western
Christian audience to see Arabs and Muslims as an ancient opponent, as an “other” 29 that rivals
the Christian world in an epic “clash of civilizations” 7, and in this way Lewis seeks to legitimize
the policies and military campaigns of his benefactors, the influential men of power who seek
what is arguably imperialistic control and hegemony in the Middle East. Therefore, the criticallythinking truth-seeker should pay no heed to the claims of such mercenary scholars, and should
instead gather knowledge of other cultures from those other cultures in order to gain full
appreciation of them and be able to critique them in an honest manner after gaining an objective
understanding of them.
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